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Despite being a very hot subject in the public debate, the causes behind the increase in social assistance (SA) in
the 1990s are relatively unknown. In this paper, I try to investigate if the increase is in part a result of an increase
in the propensity to receive SA. Despite what is usually argued in the public debate, I find no evidence of a
general increase in the mentioned propensity in Sweden during the period 1990 to 1995. But although there is no
evidence of an increased propensity to receive SA, some behavioural changes seem to have occurred. First, I find
evidence that the recipients may be subjected to tougher judgement criteria in 1995 than in the 1990, something
that could mask a possible increase in the studied propensity in the empirical analysis. Second, the propensity to
become a SA recipient has increased among people with university education. Thirdly the propensity to receive
SA among young people seems to be lower in 1995 than in 1990 but this may be due to a tougher attitude shown
by the authorities that is particularly affecting this group.
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1  Introduction
The social assistance (SA, “welfare” in U.S. terminology) system in Sweden is generating an ongoing
debate about its effects on people's behaviour. There is a widespread set of myths surrounding SA
and its recipients. Assistance recipients are often portrayed as cheaters and persons lacking the will
of being self-supporting. One of the most discussed issues is the question why the SA costs and
number of assistance recipients have increased so dramatically in the past few years.
Figure 1: Social assistance costs in Sweden 1970 – 1997 (Fixed prices, base year 1990). Source:
Socialstyrelsen (1999).
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the SA costs and the number of recipients for the period between
1970 and 1997 and show the dramatic increase in the 1990s. The costs increased from 4 722
million SKr (799 million US$) 1990 to about 10 037 million SKr (1 697 million US$) in 1997 which
is more than a 100 % increase
3. Likewise, the number of households that received SA once during a
year went from 277 000 in 1990 to nearly 402 900 in 1997, or from 7.9 to 10.7 (10.3 % in 1995)
percent of the households in Sweden (Socialstyrelsen 1999). It is also well known that the Swedish
                                                






















































































labour market experienced a dramatic change in the 1990s (see Figure 2). While the unemployment
rate was 1.6 in 1990, it jumped to 8.2 percent in 1993 and has remained high since (8.0 percent in
1997).
Figure 2: Number of households that received social assistance and the unemployment rate during
the period 1970 to 1997. Source: Socialstyrelsen (1999) and SCB (AKU).
There are two obvious reasons that could have caused the increase in SA costs and the number of
recipient households. There may be changes in the number of households that is entitled to receiving
SA or there may be an increase in the proportion of the entitled households that chooses to receive
or apply for it. Given the dramatic increase in unemployment, the increase in the number of SA
recipients is not very surprising since the number of eligible households has increased. Indeed, the
inability of other replacement systems to cover earnings shocks like those arising from unemployment
have been pointed out to be the main reasons for the increase in the number of SA recipients by
some authors (see for example Salonen (1997)). But there is also another factor that could cause an
increase in the number of eligible households, namely that people choose to make themselves eligible
for SA (e.g. by not working).





















































































































Despite the lack of empirical evidence, especially in the public debate, it is often claimed that one of
the reasons behind the increase in the number of SA recipients is a change in people’s behaviour. It
is suggested that, especially among young people, the shame associated with receiving SA has
decreased dramatically in recent years. This argument usually comes from the assumption that an
increase in the number of recipients weakens the social norm to live off one’s own work and makes
SA less shameful. Another possibility is that people who receive SA may over time come to value
their leisure time more (see for example Lindbeck & Nyberg, 1999). If so, this would lead to an
increase in the propensity (or tendency) to become a SA recipient. When we speak about an
increase in the propensity to become a SA recipient, it should be observed that there are two
dimensions involved. First, there could be a larger fraction of eligible households that chooses to
apply for and receive SA. Second, a larger number of households could make themselves eligible for
SA. It is the sum of these two factors that is meant when I refer to an increase in the mentioned
propensity.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the increase in the number of recipients in the
1990s is, in part, caused by an increased propensity to become a SA recipient or if it can be
explained by other economic factors alone. The answer to this question has important policy
implications for the design of the social insurance system. I restrict my attention to the 1990s, more
specifically to the period 1990 to 1995. Moreover, I focus on the group consisting of single
households with or without children. This is mainly due to the fact that 77 % of the Swedish
households that receive SA are households with a single adult person (see Table A 1)
4.
In order to examine these issues, I develop a static model where the decision to apply for SA is
modelled as the utility maximising behaviour. The fact that a substantial number of households, who
are entitled to SA, choose not to receive it indicates that there are non-measurable costs associated
with being a SA recipient. These “stigma” costs may be explained by a social norm that one should
live off one’s own work. See for example Moffit (1983) who finds econometric support for the
existence of such stigma costs. The higher these costs are for a given household, the lower is its
propensity to receive SA. I introduce stigma costs in my model in terms of disutility that is incurred4
by receiving SA so that both economic incentives and social norms influence individual behaviour. I
then try to empirically settle if there has been a change in the stigma costs incurred by the average
household (or average individual since I focus on single households). If this is the case, it will be
interpreted as a change in the propensity to receive SA. However, given the data, it is impossible to
distinguish whether a change in the propensity to apply for- or a change in the application of SA rules
(or both) causes the result. For example if there is an increase in the propensity to apply for SA at
the same time as the authorities have become more restrictive in granting SA (which would result in
more individuals being turned down), I could estimate the net effect as being ”neutral”. This would
then (wrongly) be interpreted as no change in the studied propensity. This problem should be
remembered when reading the results of this paper.
Although the literature on SA is vast, not many papers have dealt with the particular question asked
in this paper. The paper by Blank & Ruggles (1993) investigates the relationship between eligibility
and participation in the AFDC
5 and food stamp programs in the U.S. Their main result is that a
majority of eligibility spells are short and do not result in program participation. Hoynes (1996) finds
that welfare participation among two-parent families is highly responsive to changes in the benefit
structure under the AFDC-UP
6 program. Hoynes (1995) finds no evidence that size of welfare
contributes to increasing propensities to form female-headed households
7. Blank (1997) finds
evidence of increased take-up rates in U.S. in the 1990s. She concludes that both take-up rates and
increases in the number of eligible households contributed to the increase in AFDC program
participation.
My main result is that there are no indications of a general increase in the propensity to become a SA
recipient. Nevertheless, some behavioural change seems to have occurred since there are indications
that applicants are met by a tougher attitude in 1995. As stated above, this could mask a possible
increase in the studied propensity. Second, the stigma costs seem to have decreased significantly
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Another reason for doing this is that it simplifies the empirical analysis. By limiting our analysis to single adult
households we do not have to extend the model to the two-earner case and take account of spouses joint labour
supply decisions.
5 Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
6 Aid to Families with Dependent Children – Unemployed Parent.
7 The AFDC program provides benefits primarily to single parents with children and is generally not available to
two-parent families. Thus, the question asked in the paper is if the availability of AFDC encourages the formation
of female headed households.5
among people with higher education (implying increased propensity to become a SA recipient). Also,
contrary to what is usually argued, young people seem to have developed higher stigma costs
although this may be the result of a tougher attitude being directed especially towards this group.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the Swedish rules for SA and
section 3 deals with data description. The theoretical and empirical strategy is outlined in sections 4
and 5, respectively. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes the results.6
2  Swedish rules for Social assistance
The SA system is intended as a safety net for people that cannot maintain themselves for various
reasons. It is operated by the individual municipalities. SA is given on a household basis and is a
means-tested system. According to Swedish law, the municipalities are responsible for securing ”a
reasonable standard of living” for the individuals. The basic rule is that individuals who get into
financial troubles and cannot maintain themselves in any other way are entitled to receive SA. The
term ”a reasonable standard of living” is not defined and the municipalities have been given the
freedom to decide how this should be interpreted in the individual municipality. The National Board
of Health and Welfare establishes a guideline for the amount of SA that should be given but the final
decision is made locally in the municipality of residence. The guideline amount for 1990 (1995) is
about 39 000 (41 000) SKr
8 per year, but studies show that there are substantial variation across
municipalities. This amount is supposed to cover expenses for food and other household expenses
such as laundry, hygiene, telephone, insurance, clothes and newspapers. SA recipients are generally
also entitled to get their housing expenses paid (not included in the amounts presented above)
9. This
amount varies greatly by geographic location and individual needs
10.
The amount that a given household is entitled to is reduced on a one to one basis for any increase in
income (inclusive all other forms of transfers) that the household receives. Studies show that the
municipalities generally follow the one to one reduction rule (SOU 1992:98) and this is what I will
assume in my empirical study. Furthermore, a low-income but wealthy household is generally not
entitled to SA
11. These issues will be considered in connection with the theoretical and empirical
model below.
                                                
8 About 6600 (6930) US$ (1990 exchange rates).
9 Housing expenses is supposed to cover a reasonable amount of living in the area of residence. Individual needs
are also taken into consideration when this amount is calculated.
10 This is neglected in my estimations. This also has the advantage that we do not need to worry about regional
price variations.
11 With the term wealthy household, I refer to a household that has savings or other assets. Also, a household
could be forced to sell its other possessions (for example a car) before it gets entitled to social assistance.7
3  Data
The data I use is contained in a register-based longitudinal data set called LINDA, which is
described in Edin & Fredriksson (1997). It contains a random sample of about 290 000
12 individuals
and is constructed so that the sample is representative for the Swedish population every year. This
paper uses data from two years, 1990 and 1995, on single households between 18 and 65 years of
age. Full time students are excluded because according to Swedish rules students are not entitled to
SA except in extraordinary cases. The final sample consists of just under 70 000 individuals in 1990
and about 75 000 in 1995.
LINDA is based on the income tax register and contains yearly information on the source and
amount of labour- and other incomes, transfer payments, household composition and individual
characteristics for household members (such as educational level, nationality, sector of work etc.).
One shortcoming is that I do not observe work hours and wage rates separately. The data contains
information on the number of months and the yearly amount of SA received. Thus, there is no way of
distinguishing between repeated spells and continuous receiving. I define a SA recipient as a person
that has received SA at least once during the year.
Further, I observe the household’s taxable amount of wealth, the amount of cash in bank deposits
and the value of securities (shares excluded). As an approximation of household wealth I use the sum
of the value of bank deposits and securities at the end of the previous year (i.e. 1989 and 1994)
13.
                                                
12 3 percent of the Swedish population.
13 The variable households taxable wealth contains all household assets and is only observed if the total wealth is
larger than 800 000 SKR. None of the households in our sample for which we observe this variable (576
households in 1990 and 992 households in 1995) has received social assistance so neglecting it would not change
our results. Moreover it is not a good measure of wealth in our study since it is the liquidity of the asset that is
most important for the eligibility for social assistance. For example if the taxable wealth was high because the
household lived in an owner occupied house it could be entitled to receiving social assistance for some period
without having to sell the house. The households bank deposits and value of securities are a much better
measure of the type of wealth that would make a household being turned down when applying for social
assistance. The problem with these variables is that we are only able to observe them at the end of the year
(31/12). I feel that the amount at the beginning of the year is a better measure of the wealth that determines
whether or not a household is entitled to receiving social assistance.8
The empirical model that is developed in this paper requires data on the monthly guideline principles
in the municipalities for 1990 and 1995. Statistics Sweden has done surveys to establish the monthly
guideline principle in the municipalities. These are made on the first of February in 1991 and 1994
and also on the first of June 1996. A Swedish magazine named Kommunaktuellt has done a similar
survey in 1995 (Lundborg 1995), which concludes that the guideline principles in 1995 are very
similar to those in 1994. Also, because there is no information available from 1990, I choose to use
the 1991 values as approximations. Since the 1991 values were collected at the beginning of the year
I think that they should approximate the 1990 values quite well.
Table 1: Mean characteristics for social assistance recipients and non-recipients.
Non recipients Recipients















































Age 32.03 33.30 3.9 % 31.59 31.06 -1.7 %
% Women 45.0 45.5 1.1 % 48.6 49.7 2.2 %
# children 0.12 0.16 33.3 % 0.41 0.37 -9.8 %
% Foreigners 5.14 4.64 -9.7 % 18.59 18.36 -1.23 %
# months with SA --- --- --- 4.27 5.20 22 %
% in every educ. cat.
   1-Missing or unspecified 5.5 1.2 -78 % 21.6 5.1 -76 %
   2- <9 years 7.6 5.5 -28 % 7.4 6.5 -12 %
   3- >9 year compulsory school 15.8 15.1 -4 % 26.7 25.5 -4.5 %
   4-High school, £. 2 years 37.7 32.7 -13.3 % 35.1 33.9 -3 %
   5-High school>2years 16.7 20.8 26 % 5.1 18.3 258 %
   6-College, <3 years 9.6 16.1 68 % 2.5 7.5 200 %
   7-College, ‡ 3 years 6.8 8.2 21 % 1.6 3.0 87.5 %
   8-  PhD. 0.4 0.4 0 % 0.02 0.12 500 %
# of observations 63 310 66 219 4.6 % 5 073 7 744 53 %
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
1 Includes SA. 
2 Excludes SA
Table 1 presents means of the data together with the percentage change between 1990 and 1995.
All comparisons made between the two years use fixed prices where the 1995 amounts have been
transformed into their 1990 equivalents by using the consumer price index. As we can see SA9
recipients are more likely to be younger, men, foreign citizens and have more children than non-
recipients. In 1995, 32 % of foreign singles received SA while the corresponding figure was 9 % for
Swedes (not shown in the table). The percentage of female recipients has increased slightly. Also,
not displayed in the table is that Swedish males and females have about the same increase (about 51
%) while for foreigners, the increase in the number of female recipients is much larger than for the
males (65 % and 39 % respectively). The percentage of SA recipients belonging to the younger
(under 25 years of age) and older (over 50 years of age) age categories has increased in 1995 (not
in the table). Also, the percentage of recipients with higher education (‡ 3 years of high school or
college degree) is larger in 1995. Since there are more individuals with higher education in 1995, the
percentage of recipients in the different categories is presented in Table A 3.
The mean income and wealth have decreased for recipients as well as non-recipients although the
decrease is larger for recipients. It is interesting to note that while the mean  labour income has
decreased by 53 % for SA recipients, their total disposable income (inclusive SA) has only
decreased by 16 %. The mean wealth has decreased by 54 % for assistance recipients and by only
15.5 % for non-recipients. It is also more unusual to observe relatively wealthier households that
receive SA in 1995 compared to 1990. In the group consisting of wealthier individuals (over say 50
000 SKr. in wealth), there is a lower number of recipients in 1995
14 (although there are 53 % more
recipients in 1995 than in 1990). I will not speculate further on the causes of the lower take-up rates
among the wealthier individuals in 1995, although one reason could be that the municipalities have
become more reluctant to accord SA in later years. This is a point that I will return to later.
Table A  2 shows the percentage
15 of SA recipients according to different disposable income
(including SA) categories. A large fraction of individuals in our data set have a yearly disposable
income below the SA norm in the community in which they are situated but do still not receive SA.
The reason may be that these individuals either have wealth that makes them ineligible or that they
choose not to receive SA although they are entitled to it due to the disutility (stigma) arising from
being a SA recipient. There is also a data related problem that could explain part of this pattern.
                                                
14 About 19% (1990) and 14% (1995) of the households in the sample falls into this group. The fraction of social
assistance recipients that falls into this category is about 1,3 % (1990) and 0,5 % (1995) respectively.
15 I.e. the number of social assistance recipients in each income category divided by the total number of
households falling into the same category.10
While our data set and thus the household definition is based on the tax register, this does not always
agree with the actual household composition. More specifically, some of the households that are
defined as single in the tax register may consist of two persons living together
16. Thus, they will be a
part of our sample although they will not be regarded as single households by the administrator and
thus be subjected to different rules. For example, a person with low income that is defined as single
in the tax register may be denied SA if he/she is living together with someone who has a high
income
17. Thus, he/she will be observed as a low-income person not receiving SA. Also, if two
persons in a low-income household are granted SA, only one of them will be registered as a
recipient. Thus for such households, there is a 50 % chance that a recipient will be observed as a
non-recipient in the data. Another noticeable feature in Table A 2 is that we observe SA recipients
with disposable income levels way over the community norm, something that should be theoretically
impossible since the Swedish SA system imposes a 100 % tax rate on assistance recipients. Our
data being annual and some individuals receiving SA only partially during the year could be one
explanation to this.
4  Theory and empirical specification
18
The aim of this section is to develop a model that can be used to estimate if the propensity to be a
SA recipient has changed during the 1990s. The model assumes that the probability that a given
individual receives SA is a product of the probability that he/she applies for SA and the probability
that he/she is granted SA given application.
4.1  The individuals application decision
An individual in this model is assumed to maximise its utility over two parameters: work hours and
application for SA, i.e.:
                                                
16 The definition is that non-married persons living together without any common children are classified as single
household.
17 As stated above, SA is given on a household basis.
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where Y = wh +yn +yb and b = max (0, gk – wh - yn)
Y is the individual’s total disposable income and is the sum of earnings (wh), non-labour income (yn)
and SA (b) if received. Any increase in income reduces the amount of SA available on a one to one
basis and the maximum amount of SA that can be received is the monthly guarantee in the k:th
municipality, gk. y˛{0,1} is an indicator variable that is one if the individual applies for SA and zero
otherwise. h is hours of work that may be constrained to some level  h. Thus, the individual chooses
h and y to maximise it’s utility and from his/her point of view, the application decision is based on
the assumption that SA will be granted. The individual also gets some disutility from receiving SA
(stigma costs), which is expressed by the cost function C(z). Following Moffit (1983), disutility from
SA is assumed to be separable from the utility function. z is a number of individual characteristics that
influence the SA stigma. The individual’s labour supply decisions becomes:
(2)
h max ( )
h h . t . s
h , y wh U n
£
+ if y = 0 and,
(3)
h max ( ) h , g U k - C (z)
￿ h = 0  if y = 1.
This model thus predicts that SA recipients do not work
19. This is a direct result of the fact that the
Swedish SA rules impose a 100 % tax rate on the income of SA recipients (and assuming that leisure
is a normal good). From equation (2) and (3), we see that a given individual will choose to apply for
SA iff:
(4)
h max ( )
h h . t . s
h , y wh U n
£
+   - [
h max ( ) 0 , g U k - C (z)] < 0
                                                
19 Since our data is annual, we may (and in fact do) observe people that both receive SA and work even if this is
the right model.12
In this model, the individual has two choices; receiving gk in SA and incurring C(z) in stigma costs (in
which case it will not work) or to work and receive wh+yn in income and some disutility from work.
The individual will choose the state that yields the highest utility. From equation (4), we see that the
relevant income measures are the potential income (i.e. the total income that could be received if
working) and the guaranteed level in the municipality of residence. Adding a stochastic term,
equation (4) can be written as:
(5) Prob( y=1) = Prob [{ ( ) h *, h , y * wh U n +   - [ ( ) 0 , g U k - C (z) + e]}< 0]          or,
(6) Prob( y=1)=P[ h *, h , y * wh n + , gk, C(z)]
where h* is the optimal hours given that the individual works.
4.2  Granting probability
Given that a person has chosen to apply for SA, there is also a possibility that he/she will be turned
down. I assume that the probability to be granted SA, given application is a function of a number of
factors:
(7) P = P [W, k, wh+yn, gk]
where W is the individual’s wealth and k is a factor determining the attitude against SA applicants
that may depend on a variety of factors (such as characteristics of the applicant). The monthly
guarantee (gk) is included as a proxy for the generosity towards granting SA in the municipality. The
assumption is that municipalities giving more generous SA are generally less restrictive towards
applicants. Wealth is included in the granting equation rather than in the individual’s application
decision. The main reason for this is that it will hopefully be a good proxy for the attitude shown by
the authorities in granting SA. I.e. I assume that wealth will be a proxy for the authorities’ judgement
of the individual’s self-supporting capacity other than earnings. Including wealth in the granting13
equation (rather than the decision equation) will only effect the way we interpret its estimated
coefficient. A problem with wealth is the possible simultaneity between wealth and the SA decision,
i.e. the individual’s wealth may be influenced by his/her decision to apply for SA. I try to mitigate this
problem by using initial wealth (recorded at the end of the preceding year) and dummy variables for
wealth categories (instead of actual values) in our model. By using dummy variables, the endogeneity
of wealth may be reduced since small changes in wealth do not affect our estimates (i.e. if the
individual remains in the same wealth category).
From equation (6) and (7), the probability of being a SA recipient is given by:
(8) Prob(receive SA)= P[ h , ) z ( C , g , h , y wh
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Equation (8) is the final equation to be estimated. The theoretically expected signs are given under
each variable. Income is expected to reduce both the probability to apply for SA and the probability
to be granted given application. The monthly guarantee in the community is expected to increase the
application probability since once granted, more money will be received. It is also expected to
increase the granting probability since it is included as a proxy for the generosity towards granting SA
in the municipality. The net effect of this variable is thus assumed to increase the probability to
receive SA. Wealth reduces the granting probability while increased stigma reduces the application
probability.
When estimating the reduced form of equation (8), the interpretation of coefficient estimates partly
depends on which equation (application and/or granting) they belong to. For many of the variables
there are no strong theoretical grounds from where they should be excluded and some variables
clearly belong to both equations. Thus in some cases, the interpretations made becomes more or less
subjective.
4.3  Specifying the cost function and the hypothesis to be tested14
The cost function C(z) represents the disutility associated with receiving SA. z is a vector of
individual characteristics such as education, age and gender that may be expected to influence the
stigma costs for SA. The main hypothesis to be tested empirically in this paper is whether the cost
function differs between 1990 and 1995. To estimate if there is a general change in the probability to
receive SA, data from 1990 and 1995 will be pooled. Then, equation (8) will be estimated with a
dummy variable for 1995 included as an additional variable. If this dummy is significant, this will be
interpreted as that the propensity to become a SA recipient has changed between the two years.
Stated differently, this would indicate that controlling for potential income, wealth and personal
characteristics there is an unexplained difference between the probability to be a SA recipient
between the two years. However as stated above, given our data, it is not possible to distinguish
whether a change in the propensity or a change in the application of SA rules (or both) causes the
result. Thus, as can also be seen from equation (8) the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable
gives the “net” effect between propensity to apply for- and being granted SA given application.
The other coefficient estimates will be time averages of how particular characteristics influence the
probability to be a SA recipient and can thus give answers to a number of different questions. An
example may clarify this. It is possible that people with higher education are more reluctant to receive
SA than people with lower education. If so, we would expect the coefficient estimates to decrease
with increases in education.
By estimating separate equations for 1990 and 1995, a number of additional interesting questions
can be addressed. The coefficient estimates from separate estimations will allow us to analyse if the
stigma costs has changed for people in a particular group between the two years. For example, a
point usually made in public debate is that, especially young people, have become less reluctant to
receive SA. If so, we would expect the coefficient estimate for this group to be significantly lower in
1995 compared to 1990. As before, only the “net” effect can be observed. For example, if the
propensity to apply for SA increases for a particular group at the same time as this group is
subjected to tougher judgement criteria, I may estimate the “net” effect to be zero
20.
                                                
20 In equation (7), we assumed that the granting probability is affected by the attitude against applicants (the
variable k), which may differ between different groups. If we believe that a certain individual characteristic
influences the granting probability, it will enter the granting equation (through k) and will thus be in both the
decision and the granting equation. Thus when estimating equation (8) we will only observe the net effect.15
A problem with estimating equation (8) empirically is that I do not observe wages and work hours
separately. Thus, I have to assume that earnings is a proxy for the utility of earnings net of the
disutility for work
21. Thus, I estimate equation (8) as reflected through earnings (and thus disposable
income). Since I do not observe potential income directly (the income I observe is the income given
the choice that has been made) I will have to estimate it empirically. Stated differently, since income
is endogenous to the SA decision I cannot use the observed income in my estimations. This will be
described in more detail below.
5  Estimation results
This section provides the estimation results. I choose to estimate my model with three different
samples. First, I use the whole sample, which gives an answer to the question of whether or not there
is a general change in the take-up rate in society. Second, I estimate separate models for Swedish
and foreign citizens respectively to explore if there are any differences between these two groups.
Note that due to the relatively small sample size for foreign citizens, many coefficients have low
significance levels.
The estimation results are presented as odds ratios (relative risks) due to their easier interpretation.
An estimated coefficient of 1.1 in front of a given variable should be understood as representing a
10% increase in the relative risk of being a SA recipient. Consequently, an estimated coefficient of
0.9 means a 10 % decrease while a coefficient of 1 indicates a ”neutral effect”. It should be
observed that I do not take unobservable individual heterogeneity into account (i.e. no unobserved
individual effects are included), i.e. I implicitly assume that everyone with the same covariate pattern
has the same probability of being a SA recipient. It should also be clear that all results are ”pure”
effects since I control for wealth and income. Thus if I for example estimate a lower odds ratio
associated with a certain group of people this is not due to higher average income and wealth in this
group. When I compare the estimates between the two years it is done with respect to the base
                                                
21 I.e. we implicitly assume that utility has the form (w-l)h in earnings.16
category in each year. For example when I compare the estimated odds ratios for different age
categories between the two years, it is with respect to the base category for respective year that the
comparison is made. Thus what I am able to tell is if the relative odds of receiving SA compared to
the base category in each year differs between 1990 and 1995.
It seems reasonable to assume that the influence of income on the probability of being a SA recipient
will differ between different income intervals since a given income increase probably would have a
larger influence the lower the individual’s income is. Thus, I use a spline function instead of a simple
linear relation in this paper, which allows for a more flexible relationship. The income variable has
been divided into four segments: 0-25 000, 25 000-50 000, 50 000-100 000 and >100 000
22. The
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is that they measure the slope in each income interval.
There are three wealth-category dummy variables included in the estimations. The base category is
taken to be individuals with an observed wealth lower than 10 000 SKr. The three dummy variables
wealth1-wealth3 indicate individuals with wealth in the category 10 000 - 25 000, 25 000 - 100 000
and > 100 000 SKr. respectively. It should be observed that the income and wealth variables do not
have the same interpretation. While the income variables measure how additional income in each
income interval changes the probability of being an assistance recipient, the wealth variables are
dummies thus measuring how belonging to a certain wealth category changes the same probability
compared to the base category.
Next, I give a brief explanation about the endogeneity problem and the income variables used in the
study.
5.1  Potential income - Income equations
The endogeneity problem mentioned earlier is a result of the individuals choosing their hours of work
and thus earnings simultaneously with their decision of whether or not to receive SA. In other words,
people may take the possibility of receiving SA into consideration when they choose their hours of
                                                
22 The spline is defined in such a way that the linear segments are joined at the knots.17
work. The earnings observed (and thus the observed disposable income) in the data is thus the
individual’s earnings given its choice. What I would like to observe is the disposable income he/she
would have had if the other alternative had not been available
23.
The standard solution to endogeneity is by an instrumental variable method, i.e. instruments for the
individual’s “potential income” in the two states (recipient and non-recipient) is needed. Due to
Swedish rules, the income as a recipient can be approximated by the guideline principle in the
municipality of residence. Instruments for the non-recipient state is created by using predictions from
income equations. I.e. I estimate disposable income regressions using data from non-recipients and
then use the predicted values from these regressions as instruments of potential income for the non-
recipient state. As explanatory variables, I use individual characteristics such as education and
experience as well as other variables such as the local unemployment rate and the sector in which the
individual works. The excluded instruments in the decision function are the sector variables and the
local unemployment rate
24, which allows me to identify my model.
I have chosen to estimate separate equations for Swedish and foreign citizens for each year, which
are presented in Table A 4. All equations are estimated conditional on not receiving SA. Since there
are no good excluding restrictions, the sample selection introduced by only selecting the non-
recipient part of the population is ignored
25.
The estimated coefficient on experience is positive while the experience squared is negative. This
means that income increases with experience at a decreasing rate in the relevant interval. The
coefficient on gender shows that women have lower average income than men do. Although there
are some exceptions, the average income generally increases with education.
                                                
23 The Hausman exogeneity test confirms that the income we observe cannot be assumed exogenous (Significant
at the 1 % level).
24 The idea is that unemployment will not influence the social assistance decision other than through income.
Indeed, when the local unemployment rate is included in the social assistance equation it is in most cases
insignificant (Significant at the 10 % but not 5 % level in a few cases).
25 I have estimated Heckman type selection models without exclusion restrictions (i.e. identification by functional
form alone) and using the proportion of SA recipients in the municipality of residence as an exclusion restriction.
Both procedures yielded almost identical results to those obtained by ignoring the selection bias.18
5.2  Estimation results, pooling 1990 and 1995
Table 2 present estimation results where the observations for 1990 and 1995 are pooled. The table
contains three columns, which corresponds to samples using all individuals, Swedish citizens and
foreign citizens respectively.
The estimation results indicate no general change in the propensity to receive SA. The relative odds
of being a SA recipient do not differ between the two years, which can be seen from the fact that the
estimated coefficient of the dummy variable d95 is not significantly different from one. The same
conclusion also holds for Swedish citizens. Looking at the third column in the table, the results
indicate a decrease in the studied propensity among foreign citizens since the 1995 dummy is
significantly smaller than one.
As could be expected the coefficients in front of the income variables are less than one in magnitude
indicating that higher income lowers the probability of being a SA recipient. We see that the
estimated coefficients differ between income categories, which indicates that using a linear spline
makes sense. The guideline principle in the municipality of residence have a significant and positive
influence on the probability of being an assistance recipient. Thus, people living in more “generous”
municipalities have a higher probability of being SA recipients.19
Table 2: Estimates using specification 2 for the cost function.
All Individuals Swedish citizens Foreign citizens
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std.err.
Income (0-25’) 0.94** (0.0048) 0.99 (0.0075) 0.945** (0.0085)
Income (25’-50’) 0.96** (0.0017) 0.960** (0.0020) 0.964** (0.0045)
Income(50’-100’) 0.977** (0.00081) 0.975** (0.0009) 0.990* (0.0026)
Income (>100’ ) 0.991** (0.0010) 0.992** (0.0011) 0.990** (0.0030)
Wealth (10’-25’) 0.14** (0.0072) 0.14** (0.0076) 0.20** (0.037)
Wealth (25’-100’) 0.068** (0.0045) 0.068** (0.0049) 0.075** (0.020)
Wealth (>100’) 0.025** (0.0043) 0.027** (0.0048) --- ---
Municipality guideline 1.020** (0.0044) 1.021** (0.0049) 1.020* (0.012)
Age categories (Base: 35-39)
    Age 18-25 0.30** (0.015) 0.30** (0.015) 0.50** (0.081)
    Age 26-29 0.48** (0.023) 0.47** (0.024) 0.61** (0.081)
    Age 30-34 0.72** (0.031) 0.73** (0.034) 0.70** (0.080)
    Age 40-49 1.03 (0.042) 1.03 (0.042) 1.14 (0.12)
    Age 50-59 0.59** (0.034) 0.59** (0.036) 0.94 (0.15)
    Age 60-65 0.31** (0.036) 0.23** (0.034) 1.55* (0.345)
Gender (1=Woman) 0.80** (0.017) 0.82** (0.020) 0.68** (0.042)
Educational categories (Base: >9 years compulsory school).
    missing or unspecified 2.33** (0.071) 1.84** (0.103) 1.18 (0.073)
    <9 years 1.42** (0.060) 1.22** (0.065) 1.57** (0.19)
    High school, £. 2 years 1.26** (0.031) 1.21** (0.033) 1.06 (0.10)
    High school, >2 years 0.76** (0.024) 0.71** (0.024) 0.86 (0.097)
    College, <3 years 0.62** (0.027) 0.55** (0.027) 0.73* (0.090)
    College, >3 years 0.68** (0.039) 0.55** (0.039) 0.75* (0.095)
    PhD. 0.41** (0.126) 0.31** (0.139) 0.35* (0.15)
# Children under 16 1.70** (0.105) 1.66** (0.11) 1.62** (0.26)
Woman with children 1.22** (0.076) 1.19** (0.080) 1.36* (0.23)
Im. 1 1.03 (0.27)
Im. 2 2.24** (0.18)
Im. 3 1.36* (0.11)
Dummy 1995 0.95 (0.028) 0.96 (0.04) 0.79** (0.074)
   Log likelihood -33 591 -29 971 -3 742
   Sensitivity, Pr(+ | True)
1 68.0 % 65.2 % 74.1 %
   Specificity, Pr (- | False)
1 78.8 % 78.6 % 63.8 %
   Area under the ROC curve
2 0.82 0.82 0.77
   Correctly classified
1 77.7 % 77.6 % 66.6 %
   Pseudo R
2 0.22 0.19 0.22
# observations 141 740 133 936 7 804
Odds ratios. The odds ratio of a coefficient is calculated as exp(b) where b is the corresponding maximum
likelihood logit estimate. The standard error of the odds ratio is exp(b)*s where s is the standard error of the logit
parameter estimate. All equations include a (non-reported) constant. A linear spline is used for income. Im. 1-Im. 3
are dummy variables indicating immigration. Im. 1 indicates immigration during the current year. Im. 2 indicates
immigration during the five year period before the current year and Im. 3 indicates immigration during the five year
period before that. * Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 1 % level. Standard errors are corrected for
the two-stage procedure.
1) A cut-off value of 0.12 (0.26) is used for the first two (last) models.
2) The area under the ROC curve is a measure of the models predictive power and is the area under the curve that
graphs sensitivity versus one minus specificity as the cutoff varies. A model with no predictive power would
have area 0.5 while a perfect model would have area 1.0.20
The wealth category dummies are all significantly below one, indicating that belonging to a higher
wealth category dramatically reduces the probability of being a SA recipient (base category is 0-10
000 SKr.). Also, the estimated wealth coefficients seem to be slightly larger in magnitude for foreign
citizens. The estimate for the third wealth category for foreign citizens is missing due to the lack of
assistance recipients falling into this category.
There are some other interesting results that can be seen in Table 2. We see that women are less
likely to be recipients (especially foreign citizens), although the interaction term woman with children
has a positive effect. The younger and older persons have odds-ratios significantly below one
(compared to the base category which includes those between 35 and 39 years of age) for all- and
Swedish households. Foreign citizens present a little different pattern with slightly larger estimates in
front of the younger age categories than Swedes. Further, those between 60 and 65 years of age
also seem to have lower stigma. Those with higher education seem to be more reluctant to receiving
SA. There are also three new variables included in the estimation for foreign citizens. These are
dummy variables for three different immigration year categories and are included as control variables
for the newly immigrated. The first category (Im1) stands for the current year and the other two
divides the ten year period before the current year into two five year periods. All three dummies
come out larger than one, indicating a higher probability among newly immigrated.
5.3  Comparing 1990 and 1995
Table 3 (Swedes and foreigners) and Table A 5 in the appendix (All individuals) presents separate
estimations for the two years. The table includes a third column, which gives the p-value for the null
hypothesis of no differences between the coefficients for the two years. The p-values are calculated
as a Wald-test of the 1990 values being equal to those of 1995
26. Consequently, a low (say less than
0.05) p-value indicates that there is a statistically significant change in the corresponding coefficient
between the two years. We see that the estimated income and wealth coefficients are significantly
lower in 1995 (with one exception). Thus for every unit of increase in income or wealth, the
                                                
26 The reason why I use the 1990 as reference is that I want to avoid getting false significance since the standard
errors are smaller in 1995.21
probability of being a SA recipient is reduced more in 1995 than in 1990. Especially for the wealth
variable, one can suspect one of the underlying reasons could be that the authorities have become
more restrictive in granting SA. If the assumption that wealth is a proxy for the attitude shown by the
authorities is realistic, this may be an indication that a tougher attitude is shown in 1995 compared to
1990. Also in 1995, the probability of being a SA recipient is influenced more by the “generosity” of
the municipality of residence (The coefficient in front of the municipality guideline increases). This in
turn could be interpreted as some kind of behavioural change, which I will return to in the
conclusions below.
Age category coefficients seems to indicate that the reluctance towards receiving SA increases for
younger individuals and remains about the same for older persons compared to the base category for
all- and Swedish households. Thus, contrary to what is usually said in the public debate, young
people seem to have developed higher distaste against SA. This result may seem a bit odd but could
have its explanation in that the authorities have in particular become more restrictive in granting SA to
young people. Indeed, when I restrict the sample to persons that is 25 years or younger, the
reduction in the income and wealth coefficients is even more apparent. For foreign citizens, none of
the dummy variables are significant although the pattern seems to be similar. The estimate in front of
gender increases slightly indicating lower stigma among women in 1995 (not significant for foreigners)
although the estimated coefficient is below one in both years.
Table 3: Separate estimates for 1990 and 1995, specification 2 for the cost function.
Swedes Foreigners
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Educational categories (Base: >9 years compulsory school)



















































































































   Log likelihood -12 385 -16 952 -1 772 -1 938
   Sensitivity, Pr(+ | True)
1 64.0 % 69.4 % 66.5 % 80.8 %
   Specificity, Pr (- | False)
1 81.8 % 76.7 % 66.5 % 61.4 %
   Area under the ROC curve
2 0.82 0.82 0.74 0.79
   Correctly classified
1 80.7 % 76.1 % 66.5 % 67.5 %
   Pseudo R
2 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.21
# observations 64 307 69 629 3 802 3 993
Odds ratios. The odds ratio of a coefficient is calculated as exp(b) where b is the corresponding maximum
likelihood logit estimate. The standard error of the odds ratio is exp(b)*s where s is the standard error of the logit
parameter estimate. Standard errors are in parentheses. All equations include a (non-reported) constant. A linear
spline is used for income. Income is predicted from income equations. Im. 1-Im. 3 are dummy variables indicating
immigration. Im. 1 indicates immigration during the current year. Im. 2 indicates immigration during the five-year
period before the current year and Im. 3 indicates immigration during the five year period before that. * Significant
at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 1 % level. The column named p-val. gives the p-value for the null23
hypothesis of no difference between the estimated coefficient for 1990 and 1995. Standard errors are corrected for
the two-stage procedure.
1) A cut-off value of 0.12 (0.26) is used for the first two (last) models.
2) The area under the ROC curve is a measure of the models predictive power and is the area under the curve that
graphs sensitivity versus one minus specificity as the cutoff varies. A model with no predictive power would
have area 0.5 while a perfect model would have area 1.0.
The coefficients in front of the educational categories generally increase in 1995 for all- and Swedish
households. Looking at the coefficient estimates in Table 3, we see that the increases are especially
evident for the higher educational categories. This indicates a decrease in the reluctance among
people with higher education. Although the stigma costs still increases with education (the coefficient
estimates generally decreases with educational level) in 1995, the differences between people
belonging to high- and low educational categories is not as apparent as in 1990. For foreign citizens,
none of the coefficient changes significantly (except in the first category).
A joint likelihood ratio test of the variables in the cost function (i.e. j90 = j95) is significant at the 1 %
level. Thus, the stigma pattern seems to be significantly different between the two years.
5.4  Decomposing the change in social assistance
An interesting extension of the above analysis is to decompose variations in SA between the two
years into changes in the recipient’s average characteristics (e.g. average income and wealth together
with other individual characteristics) and changes in how different characteristics influence the
probability to be a SA recipient. The last part reveals itself in differences in the estimated coefficients


























where p 90 and p 95 stand for the (average) probability to be a SA recipient in 1990 and 1995
respectively. Taking logarithms we obtain:24
(9)  ln(p95)-ln(p90) = b95X95 - b90X90 + ln(1+e
X b90 90 ) - ln(1+e
X b95 95 )
The two logarithm terms on the right hand side of equation (9) are small
27 compared to the first two
terms so by neglecting them and adding and subtracting b90X95 we get:
(10) ln(p95)-ln(p90)@b90DX + X95Db
28
i.e. the difference in (the logarithm of) the probabilities between the two years is decomposed into a
change in the recipients average characteristics (the first term) and change in the influence of different
characteristics (the second term). Table A 6 in the appendix presents the results for two different
indexes. As we can see, 77 % (141 %) of the increase in SA can be explained by changes in the
main characteristics of the recipients. Income and wealth makes up the main part of this change.
Stated differently, a large part of the increase in SA seems to be due to decreases in average income
and wealth. The remaining 23 % (-41 %) of the change can be interpreted as coming from
behavioural changes. Here, the changes are mainly due to changes in the coefficients on municipality
guideline and higher educational categories.
5.5  Extending the period backwards
Given the results obtained for the 1990s, it would be of interest to extend the period back to the
1980s and compare the 1980s with the 1990s. Unfortunately, poor data availability makes this
difficult. Nevertheless, in this section I make an attempt to extend the period back to 1985, using the
                                                
27 The two logarithmic terms can be Taylor extended as ln(1+e
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our data, the calculated values of b90X90=-3.42 and b95X95=-3.10. If we insert these values for x into the Taylor
expression above, we see that the exponential terms are small compared to the two first terms in equation (9) that
we calculated above.
28 Alternatively, we can subtract and add b95X90 to get the expression b95DX+X90Db. The choice between which of
these expressions to use (i.e. which weights to employ) is a classical index problem and we present the results for
both.25
limited information available. The data from 1985 no longer contains any information on assets,
educational level or the sector in which labour income is earned.
The result from this exercise is presented in Table A 7 in the appendix. As can be seen, the results
do not give any support for an increase in the propensity to receive SA between 1985 and 1990.
The results should be interpreted with great caution since I lack information on important factors such
as assets.
6  Conclusions
The results presented in this paper indicate no general change in the propensity to receive SA
between 1990 and 1995. Looking at different subgroups this is also true for Swedish citizens.
Regarding foreign citizens I find evidence of a decrease in the studied propensity. I earlier stated that
one limitation with my study is that I am not able to distinguish weather the estimated net effect is the
result of a change in the propensity, a change in the application of rules or both. Although there are
no indications of an increase in the propensity to receive SA, some behavioural changes seem to
have occurred.
First, when I compare the two years, the estimated income and wealth coefficients are significantly
lower in 1995 than in 1990. This suggests that income and wealth have a larger impact on the
probability of receiving SA in 1995. Also, the amount of assistance one is entitled to has a larger
effect in 1995. The decrease in the income and wealth coefficients (which could be the result of a
tougher attitude towards recipients) together with the increase in the municipality guideline coefficient
could be the result of an increased propensity, although the estimated net effect is zero. I.e. one is
more willing to receive SA but at the same time met by a tougher attitude in 1995 resulting in a
neutral total effect. Second, the stigma associated with SA has changed for some groups between
the two years. Most noticeable is that the reluctance to receive SA seems to have been reduced
significantly among people with higher education. Third, young people seem to have developed
higher distaste against SA although this may be the result of a tougher attitude shown by the
authorities in particular being directed towards this group.2627
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Appendix A
Table A  1: Social assistance recipients distributed according to different household types, the
situation in 1995.
Married/Living together Single Man Single Woman
With children Without children With children Without children With children Without children
15 % 8 % 1 % 37 % 16 % 23 %
Table A 2: Percentage of single households that received social assistance according to different
disposable income (inclusive of social assistance) categories (in thousands SKr.).
0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70
1990 5.1 7.2 6.6 10.3 10.7 14.0 14.6
1995 4.9 9.5 14.6 17.8 22.8 28.4 22.7
70-80 80-100 100-120 120-150 150-200 >200 All
1990 11.2 7.0 5.0 4.9 5.3 3.9 7.3
1995 14.5 7.3 5.3 5.1 5.8 2.6 10.3
Table A 3: Percentage of single households in each educational category that received SA in 1990
and 1995.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1990 24 7 12 7 2.4 2 1.8 0.4
1995 33 12 16 11 9 5.2 4.1 3.930
Table A 4: Income equation estimates. Dependent variable log(Income)
Variable


































































































































































Number of observations 64 448 69 869 3 935 4 096
R
2 adjusted 0.34 0.45 0.26 0.36
All equations include a (non-reported) constant. Sector 1-Sector 4 are dummy variables indicating the sector in
which the majority of labour income is earned. The dummy variables stand for central public sector, local public
sector, non-public sector and working in banks and other financial corporations respectively. Im 1-Im 3 are
dummy variables indicating immigration. Im 1 indicates immigration during the current year. Im 2 indicates
immigration during the five-year period before the current year and Im 3 indicates immigration during the five year
period before that. Children 1-children 3 are dummy variables indicating the presence of 1, 1-3 and more than 3
children under the age of 16 respectively. * Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 1 % level. Standard
errors are in parentheses.31
Table A 5: Separate estimates for 1990 and 1995, specification 2 for the cost function, all
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Educational categories (Base: >9 years compulsory school)






















































   Log likelihood -14 279 -19 033
   Sensitivity, Pr(+ | True)
1 62.1 % 74.5 %
   Specificity, Pr (- | False)
1 88.7 % 74.1 %
   Area under the ROC curve
2 0.83 0.8232
1990 1995 p-val.
   Correctly classified
1 81.3 % 74.2 %
   Pseudo R
2 0.21 0.23
# observations 68 240 73 717
Odds ratios. The odds ratio of a coefficient is calculated as exp(b) where b is the corresponding maximum
likelihood logit estimate. The standard error of the odds ratio is exp(b)*s where s is the standard error of the logit
parameter estimate. Standard errors are in parentheses. All equations include a (non-reported) constant. A linear
spline is used for income. Income is predicted from income equations. * Significant at the 10 % level. **
Significant at the 1 % level. The column named p-val. gives the p-value for the null hypothesis of no difference
between the estimated coefficient for 1990 and 1995. Standard errors are corrected for the two-stage procedure.
1) A cut-off value of 0.12 (0.26) is used for the first two (last) models.
2) The area under the ROC curve is a measure of the models predictive power and is the area under the curve that
graphs sensitivity versus one minus specificity as the cutoff varies. A model with no predictive power would
have area 0.5 while a perfect model would have area 1.0.
Table A  6: Decomposing the total variation in the average probability of being a SA recipient
between 1990 and 1995.
b90DX + X95Db b95DX + X90Db
b90DX X95Db b95DX X90Db
Variation 0.252 0.076 0.462 -0.135
% of total Variation 77 % 23 % 141 % -41 %
The decomposition into two parts is presented for two different weights.
Table A 7: Estimation results for the period 1985-1990.
Coefficient Standard error
Income (0-40’) 0.99* (0.006)
Income (40’-80’) 1.01 (0.01)
Income(>80’) 1.01 (0.01)
Municipality guideline 1.01* (0.003)
Age categories (Base: 35-39)
   Age 18-25 1.37** (0.14)
   Age 26-29 1.19** (0.08)
   Age 30-34 1.24** (0.07)
   Age 40-49 0.76** (0.04)
   Age 50-59 0.61** (0.04)
   Age 60-65 0.49** (0.07)
Citizenship (1=Swedish) 0.18** (0.008)
Gender (1=Woman) 0.80** (0.02)
Dummy 1990 0.68** (0.03)
   Pseudo R
2 0.04
   Log likelihood -27 778
   Area under the ROC curve 0.63
   # observations 117 311
Odds ratios. The odds ratio of a coefficient is calculated as exp(b) where b is the corresponding maximum
likelihood logit estimate. The standard error of the odds ratio is exp(b)*s where s is the standard error of the logit
parameter estimate. Standard errors are in parentheses. All equations include a (non-reported) constant. A linear
spline is used for income. Income is predicted from income equations. * Significant at the 10 % level. **
Significant at the 1 % level. Standard errors are corrected for the two-stage procedure.33
Variable definitions
Experience: Calculated as age-6-years of education. Years of education is approximated for
educational categories (See above). In the data set there is also a variable for year of completion of
studies. This is missing for the big majority in our data set but for those observed, experience is
calculated as year-year of completion of studies.
Educational category: In our data set, I am able to observe educational categories, which are defined
as follows:
  1) No education or unspecified level
  2) <9 year compulsory school
  3) >9 year compulsory school
  4) High school, max. 2 year
  5) High school, >2 year
  6) College, <3 year
  7) College, 3 year or longer
  8) PhD.
Income: The income measure used is post-tax disposable income (DISPINK), which is the sum of all
kinds of earned and non-earned income including transfer payments.
Earnings (labour income): Earnings from employment and self-employment plus temporary transfer
payments that are received as a result of temporary absence from work (e.g. sickness payment).
Im. 1 - Im. 3: These are dummy variables created from the continuous variable year of immigration.
Im. 1 is 1 for those immigrated during the current year and 0 for others. Im. 2 indicates immigration
during the five-year period before the current year and Im. 3 indicates immigration during the five year
period before that.
Municipality guideline: Yearly guideline principle in the municipality of residence is calculated as 12*
the monthly guideline principle. Sources: The 1990 values are taken from SOU 1992:98 and the 1994
values from ”Statistiska meddelanden, S 45 SM 9401”, Statistics Sweden.
Municipality unemployment rate: Average unemployment rate during the year in the municipality of
residence. Source: AMS.
Sector 1-Sector 4: Dummy variables indicating the sector in which the majority of labour income is
earned. The dummy variables stand for central public sector, local public sector, non-public sector and
working in banks and other financial corporations.
Social assistance recipient: A person (household) that has received SA at least once during the
year.